New Zealand is about to redraw the map of terrestrial space governance.
Beginning in July, a new regulatory regime will take effect, imposing security, registration, and due diligence obligations on all operators of ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) within the country. That means satellite ground station operators, including commercial firms, research institutions, and international partners, will have to register with the government, disclose ownership structures, and install protective measures to prevent misuse or foreign access.
It marks a big shift, one that moves away from cooperative oversight and toward a formalised framework with sharp enforcement teeth.
It’s also a move driven less by industrial ambition than by the realities of national security. In recent years, foreign entities with undisclosed military ties have attempted to establish ground infrastructure in New Zealand under the guise of civilian research, and that’s raised concerns local facilities could be exploited for surveillance or strategic advantage.
The change reflects a broader recalibration underway in spacefaring democracies, which includes nations that launch satellites, yes, but also those exercising some degree of domestic control and regulatory or industrial involvement in space. It means that as strategic infrastructure extends skyward, attention is returning to the ground stations, antenna arrays, and transmission sites that connect orbit to earth.
For regulators, New Zealand’s model offers a case study in how a small country can punch above its weight by leaning into sovereignty, surveillance, and structure.
From soft touch to statutory muscle
Until now, New Zealand’s management of GBSI has relied on non-regulatory engagement, an approach premised on the goodwill and voluntary transparency of operators.
That approach, the government now argues, is no longer tenable.
Over the past five years, several covert attempts were made by foreign actors to establish or use local space infrastructure while concealing military ties. The concern is not only geopolitical alignment but operational control. GBSI can serve dual purposes: while ostensibly civilian, these installations may contribute to foreign military operations, surveillance, or communications.
The new framework, introduced through the Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Amendment Bill, will shift the regime onto a statutory footing. The bill mandates government registration of all ground-based space infrastructure, ensuring every installation is known, tracked, and legally accountable. Operators will also have to implement protective security measures – physical, digital, and procedural – to prevent unauthorised access, tampering, or exploitation by foreign actors. And they’ll need to do thorough due diligence to verify who owns and controls the infrastructure and to confirm its stated purpose aligns with actual operational intent.
Consumer-facing technologies like satellite phones and television dishes are excluded from scope since they pose minimal national security risk and don’t typically function as infrastructure for controlling or communicating with satellites.
But the core regulatory perimeter is still broad. It includes facilities responsible for telemetry, tracking and control, spacecraft identification, and satellite data transmission. Every GBSI site in New Zealand, whether publicly funded, privately owned, or foreign-controlled, will be required to comply.
Two phases, one purpose
The regime is designed to roll out in two stages. Starting July 2025, initial provisions come into effect, granting the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) immediate powers to act against malicious activity. The full regulatory architecture, including detailed compliance requirements, will be finalised later in 2025, with a transition period extending until 1 March 2026.
This staggered implementation is smart, and reflects both the urgency of the security risks and the operational realities facing infrastructure operators.
Many of the affected entities already maintain global operations, some with links to the Five Eyes intelligence community, of which New Zealand is a member. While coordination with international partners remains important, the domestic framework aims to ensure that New Zealand’s oversight cannot be bypassed through obscured affiliations or contractual complexity.
In line with its deterrent intent, the regime will meet non-compliance with graduated penalties. These include equipment seizure, individual fines of up to NZD $50,000 or even one year of imprisonment. Corporations will face fines up to NZD $250,000. Enforcement powers are calibrated to signal seriousness without chilling legitimate commercial or scientific activity.
It’s a balancing act, and it’s going to test both MBIE’s capabilities and the adaptability of operators.
Security on sovereign terms
The rationale underpinning the reforms is plain: as the strategic value of space infrastructure increases, so too does the risk that it becomes a vector for foreign interference.
New Zealand is a naturally attractive base for GBSI. Its geographic advantages include a relatively low-interference environment and favourable positioning for satellite tracking. But such alluring conditions make it vulnerable to exploitation.
Rather than wait for the next breach of trust, the government is opting for deterrence by design. The goal is not only to harden critical installations but to clarify the rules of engagement for all players, domestic and foreign. In doing so, New Zealand joins a growing cohort of nations recalibrating their regulatory posture in response to geopolitical tension and evolving security threats.
The move also signals a maturation of the country’s space sector governance. Once a novelty portfolio housed within innovation and science agencies, space is now increasingly treated as a domain of strategic infrastructure. That evolution will place new demands on regulators, who will have to navigate the complexities of licensing, data governance, and international collaboration – all while preserving public trust. Ad astra, per aspera.
Looking ahead: a regulatory template in orbit
New Zealand is wise to act. With documented attempts at foreign interference, a strategically valuable geographic position, and no prior statutory controls, the time to regulate is now. Its approach – statutory, targeted, and security-led – may well serve as a template for other jurisdictions balancing openness with operational control. After all, the broader implications of the reform extend beyond New Zealand’s borders. As space becomes a more contested and congested domain, terrestrial oversight of space-linked assets is the next – if not final – frontier.
For regulators, the lesson is clear: space regulation no longer ends at the stratosphere. The most consequential risks may arrive not from the stars, but from what’s hidden in plain sight: unmarked trucks and fibre lines at the edge of a paddock – quiet, ground-level infrastructure that can be exploited for foreign access or manipulation.
In this domain, what happens on the ground increasingly shapes what’s possible and, critically, permissible above it.
New Zealand’s grounded strategy for space regulation
New Zealand is about to redraw the map of terrestrial space governance.
Beginning in July, a new regulatory regime will take effect, imposing security, registration, and due diligence obligations on all operators of ground-based space infrastructure (GBSI) within the country. That means satellite ground station operators, including commercial firms, research institutions, and international partners, will have to register with the government, disclose ownership structures, and install protective measures to prevent misuse or foreign access.
It marks a big shift, one that moves away from cooperative oversight and toward a formalised framework with sharp enforcement teeth.
It’s also a move driven less by industrial ambition than by the realities of national security. In recent years, foreign entities with undisclosed military ties have attempted to establish ground infrastructure in New Zealand under the guise of civilian research, and that’s raised concerns local facilities could be exploited for surveillance or strategic advantage.
The change reflects a broader recalibration underway in spacefaring democracies, which includes nations that launch satellites, yes, but also those exercising some degree of domestic control and regulatory or industrial involvement in space. It means that as strategic infrastructure extends skyward, attention is returning to the ground stations, antenna arrays, and transmission sites that connect orbit to earth.
For regulators, New Zealand’s model offers a case study in how a small country can punch above its weight by leaning into sovereignty, surveillance, and structure.
From soft touch to statutory muscle
Until now, New Zealand’s management of GBSI has relied on non-regulatory engagement, an approach premised on the goodwill and voluntary transparency of operators.
That approach, the government now argues, is no longer tenable.
Over the past five years, several covert attempts were made by foreign actors to establish or use local space infrastructure while concealing military ties. The concern is not only geopolitical alignment but operational control. GBSI can serve dual purposes: while ostensibly civilian, these installations may contribute to foreign military operations, surveillance, or communications.
The new framework, introduced through the Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Amendment Bill, will shift the regime onto a statutory footing. The bill mandates government registration of all ground-based space infrastructure, ensuring every installation is known, tracked, and legally accountable. Operators will also have to implement protective security measures – physical, digital, and procedural – to prevent unauthorised access, tampering, or exploitation by foreign actors. And they’ll need to do thorough due diligence to verify who owns and controls the infrastructure and to confirm its stated purpose aligns with actual operational intent.
Consumer-facing technologies like satellite phones and television dishes are excluded from scope since they pose minimal national security risk and don’t typically function as infrastructure for controlling or communicating with satellites.
But the core regulatory perimeter is still broad. It includes facilities responsible for telemetry, tracking and control, spacecraft identification, and satellite data transmission. Every GBSI site in New Zealand, whether publicly funded, privately owned, or foreign-controlled, will be required to comply.
Two phases, one purpose
The regime is designed to roll out in two stages. Starting July 2025, initial provisions come into effect, granting the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) immediate powers to act against malicious activity. The full regulatory architecture, including detailed compliance requirements, will be finalised later in 2025, with a transition period extending until 1 March 2026.
This staggered implementation is smart, and reflects both the urgency of the security risks and the operational realities facing infrastructure operators.
Many of the affected entities already maintain global operations, some with links to the Five Eyes intelligence community, of which New Zealand is a member. While coordination with international partners remains important, the domestic framework aims to ensure that New Zealand’s oversight cannot be bypassed through obscured affiliations or contractual complexity.
In line with its deterrent intent, the regime will meet non-compliance with graduated penalties. These include equipment seizure, individual fines of up to NZD $50,000 or even one year of imprisonment. Corporations will face fines up to NZD $250,000. Enforcement powers are calibrated to signal seriousness without chilling legitimate commercial or scientific activity.
It’s a balancing act, and it’s going to test both MBIE’s capabilities and the adaptability of operators.
Security on sovereign terms
The rationale underpinning the reforms is plain: as the strategic value of space infrastructure increases, so too does the risk that it becomes a vector for foreign interference.
New Zealand is a naturally attractive base for GBSI. Its geographic advantages include a relatively low-interference environment and favourable positioning for satellite tracking. But such alluring conditions make it vulnerable to exploitation.
Rather than wait for the next breach of trust, the government is opting for deterrence by design. The goal is not only to harden critical installations but to clarify the rules of engagement for all players, domestic and foreign. In doing so, New Zealand joins a growing cohort of nations recalibrating their regulatory posture in response to geopolitical tension and evolving security threats.
The move also signals a maturation of the country’s space sector governance. Once a novelty portfolio housed within innovation and science agencies, space is now increasingly treated as a domain of strategic infrastructure. That evolution will place new demands on regulators, who will have to navigate the complexities of licensing, data governance, and international collaboration – all while preserving public trust. Ad astra, per aspera.
Looking ahead: a regulatory template in orbit
New Zealand is wise to act. With documented attempts at foreign interference, a strategically valuable geographic position, and no prior statutory controls, the time to regulate is now. Its approach – statutory, targeted, and security-led – may well serve as a template for other jurisdictions balancing openness with operational control. After all, the broader implications of the reform extend beyond New Zealand’s borders. As space becomes a more contested and congested domain, terrestrial oversight of space-linked assets is the next – if not final – frontier.
For regulators, the lesson is clear: space regulation no longer ends at the stratosphere. The most consequential risks may arrive not from the stars, but from what’s hidden in plain sight: unmarked trucks and fibre lines at the edge of a paddock – quiet, ground-level infrastructure that can be exploited for foreign access or manipulation.
In this domain, what happens on the ground increasingly shapes what’s possible and, critically, permissible above it.
Paul Leavoy
RELATED POSTS
New Zealand’s regulatory standards experiment faces
England’s housing reckoning: Awaab’s Law and
Regulatory Standards Bill advances despite record
POPULAR POSTS
Europe softens its stance on GMOs as regulators weigh the future of food
A billion-dollar message: ANZ, APRA, and the quiet power of proactive regulation
APRA signals overhaul of bank capital standards to address climate stress
Stay ahead of regulation
News, insight, and analysis weekly